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(i)
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ASPECTS OF OPEC: AN INFORMATIONAL NOTE
The purpose of this note is to present a summary description of several
financial aspects of OPEC and their relation to the world's capital markets.
A brief analysis of this information is also included, but the main purpose
is to collect and present the information in a systematic way, including
sources.
The following questions were of particular interest when OPEC members
raised the price of oil in 1973:
(1) What will be the intertemporal accumulation f surplus
funds by OPEC given several possible scenarios?
(2) How will the investment disposition (OPEC's portfolio
choices) of these surplus funds affect the world
capital markets?
(3) What proposals did members of the world's financial
community present to facilitate the investment of
these funds and the financing of consumer-country
trade deficits?
(4) What specific financial policies did consumer countries
implement in reaction to the radical changes in world
oil markets?
In this note we have compiled information as a source for subsequent
analysis. The information is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
a summary of the many forecasts of OPEC accumulated financial surpluses.
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Section 3 presents the estimated investment disposition of these surplus
funds with particular focus on the U.S., U.K., and Euromarkets. Section 4
is a brief discussion with an extensive source listing of the various
financial proposals. Section 5 presents sources for a chronology of the
major financial events which led up to the 1973 price rise and thereafter.
Finally, Section 6 is a brief summary of the changes in U.S. corporation-tax
policy which came about after the 1973 OPEC actions.
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1. FORECASTS OF OPEC ACCUMULATED FINANCIAL SURPLUSES
Forecasts of OPEC accumulated capital holdings abroad have been issued
by many authoritative sources. These sources include commercial banks,
governmental agencies, and international institutions. The forecasts are
aggregative in nature but usually account for explicit assumptions as to:
(1) cartel behavior regarding price and production decisions; (2) OPEC
member countries' absorption; and (3) worldwide demand for OPEC oil.
However, the validity and consistency of many of the assumptions are often
questionable. As to methodology, none of the forecasts appears to be based
on either econometric modeling techniques or other rigorous analytical
approaches. Rather, they are arithmetic extrapolations of hypothesized
scenarios. None explicitly takes account of the simultaneity involved in
the pricing, production, and absorption decisions of OPEC.
The first part of this paper discusses the general assumptions used in
the forecasts. Then a summary of the specific scenario assumptions of some
of the individual forecasts is presented. Finally, a comparative presentation
of the various forecasts' revenues and surplus investible funds is made.
1.1 General Assumptions and Methodology
Basic to all these forecasts is the OPEC price, production, and absorption
scenarios hypothesized. The usual presumptions are:
1Absorption, as herein used, is defined as consumption + domestic
investment + government expenditures.
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(1) The OPEC cartel will hold together in an effective enough
manner so as to cooperate on price and production decisions.
(2) Non-OPEC sources of energy will be developed but their effects
will only be felt longer term.
(3) The world economy will recover from the present recession and
moderate expansion will be sustained. Changes (both actual and
expected) in relative prices of goods will be brought under
control, and adequate financing of deficit countries will
be facilitated.
(4) OPEC absorption will increase dramatically, not only in terms
of rising per capita consumption but also in specific domestic
capital investment plans to industrialize OPEC members' economies.
Discussing the above in turn, the effective cartel assumption presumes
OPEC's behavior is that of a single monopolist facing a relatively price-
inelastic demand curve. OPEC will try to maximize oil revenues over the
medium term. The general assumption is that the oil-importing countries have
now moved down to a relatively inelastic (short- to medium-term) portion of
their demand curve. Long-term demand is usually assumed more elastic (e.g.,
the IBRD assumes near zero to 0.6 now, but moving up to unitary price-elasticity
of demand by 1985).
This cohesive cartel hypothesis implicitly assumes that the low-absorption
capacity OPEC countries1 will incur the idle oil production capacity2 necessary
Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
(primarily Abu Dhabi).
Idle capacity estimates of 60% to 100% by 1985 are common--e.g., Fried
of Brookings Institute.
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to maintain the high price level. This then becomes a study in cartel
revenue sharing. The brunt of this idle capacity will be borne by Saudi
Arabia. Thus political factors can become an even more important determinant
of OPEC's cohesiveness. For example, as high absorption (all not Arab) OPEC
countries and fringe members strive to maintain real oil revenues in the face
of more elastic, or only moderately growing oil demand, Saudi Arabia may be
forced to sacrifice both market share and revenues to maintain the revenue-
maximizing price. Will she, a traditionally conservative country, support
the excesses of others? Most forecasts assume the high absorption countries
will incur relatively small deficits in future years. Thus, the low absorbers
will incur the surplus and the netting out of the deficit OPEC countries to
yield net surplus is not a significant problem in the analysis.
The assumption of longer-term availability of alternative methods of
energy supply includes substitutes such as coal, solar, etc., as well as
increased exploration and development of non-OPEC oil fields. The usual
premise is that the current high OPEC prices will stimulate these other
activities, but that their supply effects won't be felt over the medium
term. OPEC's unique price, production cost, and reserve (supply) situation
will presumably allow it to counter any short- to medium-term economic
threats from these alternative sources. Political considerations such as
Project Independence are usually assumed away to the longer term. This is
not to imply that all forecasts assume OPEC's high prices will hold in real
terms. Many forecasts see the real price declining in adequate fashion
for OPEC to limit the energy substitution effects through, say, 1980 or 1985.
1Recall the assumption is that OPEC as a whole is a single monopolist.
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The forecasts imply the world economy will recover soon and the financial
adjustment process, "recycling," will not be a constraint. This assumption
subsumes OPEC's intertemporal portfolio decisions. For example, nowhere is
there much concern regarding OPEC's tradeoff of oil in the ground vs. external
financial instrument investment. The premise is that OPEC's supply strategy
will not only maximize revenues but be adequate to fuel world economic
recovery and growth.
The assumptions on OPEC absorption are crucial, and care must be taken
not to underestimate their importance as it affects these forecasts. In all
OPEC, though perhaps to a lesser extent in Kuwait and Iran, the large increase
in oil revenues in 1974 certainly implies some significant structural changes
in domestic investment and consumption. These structural changes must be
considered in addition to the more obvious wealth and income effects. OPEC
appears to perceive their new pricing strategy results as a change in
permanent, not transitory, income.
After the production/pricing decisions, the absorption-related decisions
by OPEC have very important ramifications regarding their surplus investible
funds abroad. Indeed, the components of OPEC absorption, such as the amount
and type of domestic investment, are a determinant of future non-oil OPEC
revenues as well as of the portfolio decision regarding the supply of oil.
Early forecasts underestimated absorption. More recent ones extrapolate
substantial increases in absorption based on current rates of increase in
OPEC imports and on government-announced development plans. Further, most
forecasts imply a zero price elasticity of demand for imports by OPEC in that
different scenarios of change in relative prices contain the same volume of
OPEC imports.
1Many of these development plans have been cut back from their original
levels.
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Implicit in these extrapolations is the existence of a sophisticated
infrastructure--e.g., administrative and planning talent, port facilities,
distribution and maintenance systems, etc. The various forecasts of surplus
OPEC funds have treated lightly the complicated questions posed by absorptive
capacity, particularly as regards structural shifts.
In sum, the various forecasts available appear to be useful only as
first approximations for the near term. They clearly lack analytical rigor.
Each is based on a scenario of OPEC price/production strategies. This
determines oil revenues. From revenues is subtracted absorption, the
residual being surplus investible funds available for investment abroad in
either direct or portfolio form. The elasticities of these estimates of
surplus investible funds with respect to each of the three key elements--
production, price, and absorption--are quite high. For example, a $1/bbl
change (approximately 10%) in price in the recent (June 1975) First National
City Bank forecast for 1976 implies a change in total revenues of $9.9 billion
(approximately 10%). Thus the forecaster's scenario assumptions are crucial
to the estimate of surplus. Forecast errors of small percentages in price,
production, or absorption can cause large swings in OPEC revenues and surplus
investible funds. Further, the assumed rate of return from dividends, interest,
etc., on the foreign investments is seen to be a crucial variable, particularly
in future years if the accumulated investment becomes large.
None of the forecasts discuss the investment disposition of the surplus
funds. From a portfolio point of view, this is an important concern.
Unfortunately, it is subsumed along with the "recycling" problem by these
studies. But the disposition of these forecasted surplus funds is important
in terms of the ability of world capital markets to absorb them. Capital
market constraints, in turn, feed back into the price/production and absorption
decisions.
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In 1971, the combined capital markets of sevenl major countries absorbed
$338.8 billion of new funds, a large amount compared to most forecasted annual
additions to OPEC surplus. However, the qualitative characteristics, i.e.,
investment disposition analysis, desired by OPEC investors may make the pure
volume comparisons invalid.
Some forecasts have been continually revised--e.g., Morgan Guaranty.
However, the other source forecasts usually draw on the ones dated previous,
and are issued in response to a new world situation. Thus, in this sense,
we can monitor the effects of changing oil market circumstances, both
economic and political, on forecast revision. The primary factors giving
rise to forecast revision are changing expectations of:
(1) OPEC price/production strategies
(2) Relative prices and OPEC absorption
(3) Elasticity of oil demand, including alternative source availability,
by the industrialized countries.
The following is a summary of the major forecasts to date. As can be
seen there is wide divergence among some of the studies compared to others.
For example, the commercial banks forecast a short-term peak in surplus
funds, whereas the IBRD study and the more recent Levy report show much
higher surplus accumulations. These differences are due to the marketplace
scenarios assumed as reflected in the price/production and absorption
figures. Further, the studies don't necessarily agree on the past results
of 1973 and 1974.
1Canada, U.S., France, Italy, Japan, U.K., and Germany
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1.2 Summary of Major Forecast Assumptions
The following list includes only those assumptions stated explicitly by
the respective forecasts. Many forecasts listed none of their assumptions.
Exxon Corporation
1. Price: Oil prices will remain constant in real terms.
2. Production/Demand:
(a) "Low Demand" scenario assumes a recovery from
current depressed levels of OPEC oil exports up
to around 30 mb/d and then holding steady at
that level.
(b) "Intermediate Demand" assumes a moderate growth
in demand for OPEC oil beyond 1980.
3. Absorption: Emphasizes the separability of OPEC countries
into low absorbers accumulating surpluses and high absorbers
incurring small deficits on current account.
First National City Bank
1. Price:
(a) "High" scenario assumes constant real prices.
(b) "Central" scenario assumes a gradual reduction in
nominal price (not government take) from $11.40/bbl
to $9.10 in 1980.
(c) "Cartel breakdown" scenario assumes that, due to
revenue-sharing disagreements among OPEC members,
price cutting will begin in 1978 and the price
will fall to the "free market" level of $5 to
$6/bbl in 1975 dollars.
(d) "Low" scenario assumes there will be sharp OPEC price
cuts in the 1980 to 1985 period with 1985 prices
leveling at $7/bbl, in current dollars ($4.50/bbl
in 1975 dollars).
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2. Production/Demand:
(a) "High" scenario assumes the demand for OPEC oil will
remain high in 1975 and grow moderately through 1985.
It assumes a relatively low price elasticity of demand.
(b) "Central" scenario assumes a gradual increase in OPEC
oil exports from 26 mb/dl in 1975 to 31 mb/d in 1980.
Also, 1985 production will be only slightly higher
than 1973.
(c) "Cartel Breakdown" assumes the cartel will break its
supply control in 1978.
(d) "Low" scenario assumes demand will drop to 25 mb/d
in 1975, increase temporarily in 1976 and 1977, then
fall to 22 mb/d in 1980, then increase to 27 mb/d
in 1985.
Walter J. Levy
1. Price: Assumes that OPEC total nominal government take per barrel
will rise by the rate of inflation, 12% in 1976 and by 7%/year
thereafter; thus the real price per barrel will remain constant.
2. Production/Demand: Assumes OPEC export volumes will be as follows
in millions of barrels per day:
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
29.6 26.5 30.0 31.5 32.5 32.5 31.5
3. Absorption: Assumes the annual rate of growth in the volume of
OPEC imports of goods and services will be 15% through 1980.
Further, the import prices faced by OPEC will rise by 12% in
1975 and 7%/year thereafter.
Irving Trust Company
1. Price:
(a) "Case A: Scenario assumes that nominal prices (not
government take) will rise at a somewhat higher rate
than inflation in 1975 and 1976, keeping pace with a
7% rate of inflation thereafter.
million barrels per day.1mb/d means
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(b) "Case B" scenario assumes the price will decrease
beginning in 1977 as OPEC cohesion is weakened by
oversupply [production capacity?] reaching $7/bbl
in 1980 ($4.50/bbl in 1974 dollars).
2. Production/Demand: Assumes a gradual decrease in OPEC oil
exports to 24.7 mb/d in 1977 and hold level thereafter
through 1980. In general, their scenario seems to imply
a zero price elasticity of demand.
3. Absorption: Assumes a 20% annual growth rate in the volume
of OPEC imports.
Edward R. Fried-Brookings Institute
1. Price:
(a) "Winter 1975" scenario assumes that "after a few years"
prices will stabilize at about $5/bbl (in 1973 dollars
f.o.b. Persian Gulf)
(b) "March 1975" scenario assumes "Oil prices in real terms
should gradually decline from current levels, though
remaining substantially above the soft prices of the
1960's.
2. Production/Demand:
(a) "Winter 1975" scenario assumes a steady, though moderate
growth in OPEC oil exports so as to maximize producer
revenues long-term.
(b) "March 1975" scenario assumes oil demand, in time, will
decrease substantially due to increased development of
alternative energy sources, increased exploration for
oil, and increased energy self-sufficiency policies in
importing countries. OPEC excess productive capacity
(today 10 mb/d) will exceed demand by two-thirds in
1980 and by more than 100% in 1985.
Keith McLachlan and Narsi Ghorban
1. Price:
(a) "Case A" scenario assumes an average OPEC government
take of $7/bbl for 1974 (posted price of $11.65) and
$7.70 for 1975.
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(b) "Case B" scenario assumes a weighted average government
take (including participation buy back agreements and
government's own sale) of $9.38/bbl for 1974 and
$10.30 in 1975.
(c) "Likely" scenario assumes the nominal price will increase
8% to 10% per year to offset industrialized countries'
inflation.
2. Production/Demand: The three respective scenarios assume OPEC
output as follows in mb/d:
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
"Case A" 22.8 25.4
"Case B" 22.8 25.4
"Likely" 22.9 25.0 26.8 28.5 29.7 30.9
Note that the identical production figures for Cases A and B
imply a zero price elasticity of demand.
IBRD
1. Price:
(a) "Case 1" scenario assumes real prices (in 1974 dollars)
remain level at the early 1974 level of $8.65/bbl
through 1985.
(b) "Case 2" scenario assumes a gradual decline in the real
price to $7/bbl (in 1974 dollars) by 1985.
2. Production/Demand: The two cases assume the following levels of
OPEC oil exports in millions of metric tons:
1975 1980 1985
"Case 1" 1577 1766 2000
"Case 2" 1577 2084 2430
Thomas R. Stauffer
1. Price: Seems to imply that nominal prices will hold at the
new high levels.
2. Production/Demand: Assumes that the higher prices will dampen the
growth of oil demand from 11% or 12% per year to, say, 4%.
3. Absorption: OPEC's imports will grow by some 15% per year.
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Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, as reported in World Financial Markets (WFM)
1. Price:
(a) WFM of 1/22/74: Current nominal prices will decrease
10% in 1974.
(b) WFM of 9/23/74: 1975 prices will increase 5% over
1974 and by one-half the rate of world inflation
thereafter.
(c) WFM of 1/21/75: assumes a 5% per annum increase in
OPEC government take per barrel through 1980.
2. Production/Demand:
(a) WFM of 1/22/74: oil production will remain level in
1974 compared to 1973.
(b) WFM of 9/23/74: demand for OPEC oil will increase
3% to 4% in 1975 over 1974.
(c) WFM of 1/21/75: demand for OPEC oil will hold steady
at 1974 levels through 1980.
(d) WFM of 3/19/75: demand for OPEC oil in 1975 will be
lower than the 1974 level, but will increase back to
1974 levels and hold steady there from 1976 to 1980.
3. Absorption:
(a) WFM of 1/22/74: OPEC imports of goods will be as follows
in billions of current dollars:
1972 1973 1974
17 25 35
(b) WFM of 9/23/74: OPEC's import volume will increase by
20% to 25% per year through 1980. Accounting for
inflation, specific dollar imports of goods and
services will be as follows in billions of current
dollars:
1972 1973 1974 1975
18 27 45 to 50 65 to 70
(c) WFM of 1/21/75: the volume of OPEC imports will increase
at an annual average rate of 20% through 1980. Price
inflation of these imports will be 12% in 1975 and 7%
annual average thereafter.
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OECD
1. Price:
(a) "Case 1" assumes real (relative) prices (1974 levels)
remain constant.
(b) "Case 2" assumes real (relative) prices (1974 levels)
remain constant.
(c) "Case 3" assumes real (relative) prices (1974 levels)
remain constant.
(d) "Case 4" assumes there will be a substantial reduction
in oil prices in 1975.
2. Production/Demand:
(a) "Case 1" assumes total demand for OPEC oil in 1980 will
be approximately equal to that of 1973.
(b) Cases 2, 3, and 4 assume demand for OPEC oil grows from
1974 to 1980 with the 1980 level being 15% to 20% above
that of 1973.
3. Absorption:
(a) Cases 1, 2, and 4 assume the high absorption OPEC countries
will be running small current account deficits by 1980. They
further assume that the low absorption OPEC countries will
have import volume levels in 1980 of four times that of 1974
due to grand development scheme implementation.
(b) Case 3 assumes the high absorption OPEC countries will be
running small current account deficits by 1980. They
further assume that the low absorption OPEC countries
will have import volumes in 1980 of only twice that of
1974 due to long lags in private sector build ups of
import demand and a relatively underdeveloped infra-
structure in OPEC countries.
Japanese Export-Import Bank
1. Price:
(a) Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 assume a constant real weighted
average government "take" of $10.12/bbl. This is the
level established in November 1974 by most OPEC
producing countries.
(b) Scenario 5 assumes a constant real weighted average
government "take" of $8/bbl.
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2. Production/Demand: The respective scenarios assume the following:
Demand
1 28.0
2 28.0
3 28.0
4 28.0
5 28.0
for OPEC
33.4
28.8
24.2
16.0
33.4
Oil in mb/d
43.4
33.1
24.5
15.0
43.4
1974 to 1985 Annual
Average Growth Rate
(% Change)
+4.1
+1.5
-1.2
-5.8
+4.1
Scenario
Scenario
Scenario
Scenario
Scenario
-16-
0(N
Nu
(n
CNHi H
t0D t0
HL H
C 00C
- -I
ur LrnH Hl
00 H m (N
H4 H H- H- H H-
Ln 10 O ( k.0 0 1(N N H H 0 H 0 HH H H- H- H-- H- H
0o 0 o 0 C OH HHl H H H
cN N l O0
1n U1
H- Hi
~ a)
--I
1;
r,1; 0')
N 0) 
I )- I-r 2a a)
O 0 Q) 4-)~~~aQ
mn H 
10 10H H H- H -H
m(N(N
r
H4
10 'OL H
14 -4
0 co0
1;T LO
1-- -
en 0( U)
H H
O 0l r
k.0
rl)
r-f
(N a.o N
N O 
L) 0 00 0 00 1 O
co 0o) '. mN N > Hq
H4
N ( CO 10 10 LO M(N (N ( H H-4 HN
(N
1)
H N
U C
r
.. ,
Ln
3 u
0
N I
4 4 5 4 .3 .4-) 4 .34J 4
=frd rd rd=1 rd m r
0 U 
i 4 r 9 ZO 9 9 ZO 9tr
H (N 1 r' 0 r-
. f
-44) 4-0 4 N
aat r z z m
0" 0"., 4
Z mm
ZO co'C
Co O~ 0 H (N (03 3 ~ Hq H
4 r-4 r-q 1-
r 
IQI
~0 0~
0 °U1- 1 -0a) a) 
O ':' ' H
H ,. -3 - *i- a)
v S @ > oD oo 
0
co
co
r-
r-
N-
?0
-
-
NS,
C
o
rr
H
Ua
U)0
00
Hu100a0
O
oO
HH0za)q
u
H4J
0a)H
U
H
U)9
a)10
O
U
010
'.oH
Hl
>1
0
Un
a)
a)
a)
kH
.Iq0
H tv4
0 Q0
En
a) 41J
(Sa) 
H d
r
· 4 1110ca)
u
0
o)U)
-17-
cm c Co m N "o -:Co CO ' N M t H ( m) ( - i H
o
H rcO 00 -i
00
D O OH H stD  H
H1 10 N N
H- N NH- H- H H-
cN H (N (N H H
(N O CO
0 ~:r 0 H
O 0 o H 0 r-
H H H 
o 0u) m 0 0000000 0 H 1 1H H 1 H H H 1 1 
10
(0
10
ONr,
~1 U0 0
04 
4-)
4 4Jo a a 
Ln z ln E
Q0 0
H 24
U) U 4 El l 0 4 t
U) H U >0-' (Ti 
E~ '-4- O, 0
-H Nm
U) U! ," -H -
QI H m H H
0
rJ
U
r
~.. U
) a O
1 0r uz
0 U f) d
U)
O O
H H O
* U) -H
oH N ( : 1 '. N Co O
N (N (N N (N N N N N
0 0 0 0 0
H -H -H -H H
I rd I 
U2 m) U) U) a)
00 00'
N Nv
H H H H H H H
· rl
_ _ _ c~mpl ~ c
OrorEEEEE 4
r (r) X m n t
0
4J,
00
0a)
0 :. 0U)
>1 0
L0
Co
0
N
-
-
I-
-
-N(0
CN
-
0
H-
4.)
r
Eq
H
U)0
0
U)
EDt4N(d
0
To
r-
0'
4)
U)
0U
To
-18-
00Hl
( o
o 00 
o r rM (N4 
k.H
-o
rl
00
o0u
H 0
o r-
O r N
., M c,
,-j -I -
000 0 
m r- r- N
I ,H H H-
o r
', o4
o 0 o1 1 
1--i -I --
0o
0 0
44 44
o m 0o o00 o o o0o )n o0 0 u) 0
m o Nmm mm N
0
N--
o n Ln
.0 n0
0 00 0 
s to 9 
mr o n ',D
- - N-I 
N
I
SrV O~ M I u) 'gON- [h " -. . . N r- ,
4- 4 C] i = H H RQ t 4 E i 4 J U -H 0 - U ,-
0 O ( ( 0 M 
>1 4444 44
H (N m >V In O O U 0 H
,-I 0
r-
.-i r
Q4
>1
) H
(0 ( (I
H CN M
U U UMf In co)(S M0tM
u~ Cu u
rl
r3
r-qNH
-)
0
a aH H
o u
N , I n t0u
a)
(0
U
.. e
>r >1HoH
o Co
r H
In
CO
0
CO
u,
o
CON-
N-
N-
0
r-
)n
N
r-N
(N)
-
-
oo
In
Lr
0
(N
ODCOH0
In
Hl
0
Hq
EN
I:L4
,-
.H
,-I
m
rO
4J
o
U)
H0a)
U1
o
r,o(1E-4En:5I-
"Q
8a)0040
En
1--
0
rcl
N
r-
0i--i
-IU(0
-19-
00(N
O 00 00 00 N
1n ) %O H
0
4-
o 0
-IJ 4)
00 Ln 00 .. LN
04 C 1- 
O LO
rlcqN
Ln o o or 0 o oH,- - o
o0
H--
r-
0 ) k.0H4 0 0
- 1 H-4
0 0 *
0o 'O '.0
Ln
CN
Ln
u (*
N rN
H 0H u
0 0ml m
0 a 0
.-H *H1
r~4 Hz
Fe. .
00
a ) :j m o
- U) H 
4 U4 H 4 4
H - (L)
4-4 H1U) k W U U
U) U 4i 4 P
t) U) r. Z
4-i :> >
ul c) 24 4 < () H H H
O 0 m 4 10 0 N O 0 Y O H 0 N C'. 04 U10 
>1
o0
U)
U)
0 
H Sr.w
4mk da a
-IH
·rqr0
sQ Om (n
rl Qr.
U) )2
(d AQ
U)
54
(U
r-4
0
F%
8
cU8,+J
o 0
00 o) N 
c31 (N V 
LOU)
0
co
-
k9
-
nCTNN
N
N-
0 
N(
UIn) oo
0 C
.N H
m 0
N cN
00
00
<cS >
U)* ;a
a,
Eq0rl
.14
4J
r.
OD O
3 O3 CO
10
0'
10
r-
4J
r ,-
' -4 a
z 8
,/ m,.
LnIn N
H
r r
U U)Q z
H P
} U)
U) ()
a) Q
oa10
>11)
(a
U)
L)
0
rq
a 0)
. (
U) b
:) U)
In Ht~
rr
>1 i
oU)
U
5.4
0
U)
-20-
0 in 0 Ui 0 0 
m c (N I U" '" IH I in r I
o H o' o o N
:V H n o ko Hi%v in N Ln In rn
nr n o0 c n COH Lr N 0 CON O
r--'l N r-" 0") m (Y'
m N cc 0
oN 0 H
r D C
o o oo N
N cN H (N
C in in n 00 
H N H H (N n
o0 o 0 0 LO
0 N 0 en a 0H (N H H (N
Oe o o o N n 
OH 0 m n o H o H H
HoHoH H N1
1 4 1 H--I 
')
C f:: H
0 u 0 -1.
N 14 N NNN
ci) t)) U) b d
r=~~
u) H (N .- (N
C O I I I I4
UOH (N (N () ( X X
cn) U w u) U) mm mm
movu 00 >- :>, > >
r4 H4 H *4
.. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~I .. .. q .. .. U U Ln ln n n i 
N N N N N N H H H H
H H H H H H H -) U) U) U) U) ) Z Z Z; X
@ a) O O al t H CO CO
U) U)
s-I 5.
'0 N. cc o o , (N o 1 ;; in ' 0 -c a'
rn mn m e' , , s' r , .', ', I '
4- .H -1 - H - ,1
U U 0 U 0) U) u) m t m
Ln
**
a a'
.3 H
O <CO
H Ho
X X 0r- rq 
0w x4
in n
N N
H --I
I I
X X
U) U)
U) a)
040
CO, CO01
in in
N Ln
ra r
H H
H HII
X X
c) U)
) toI a,
m 404CO C
F) a)
Ln O Ln Ln in LO
,-4
00
U)
a)
U) U
5.4
(o a)H k0 H0
0 k
0
"I
No
r-
m
NenenP
'.0
Ln
o
000
-
cor-,CO
-
m
r-NNenN(N
N
Hn
H--
(N
Hl
O uLn L
N in 
c
430
-H
U8
N
W
a
uci
in Ln
a
n
o U)43
4.
43
0"0
in CO a'
H1 H U4
H o
H P4- 
H P4l
U)
H U)0
O
4r- 0
U) n 5V
UO k
0 r 
-21-
2. THE DISPOSITION OF OPEC INVESTMENTS IN THE U.K., U.S., AND EUROMARKETS
There is a dearth of substantiated data and information regarding the
investment disposition of OPEC surplus investible funds. This is
particularly true of the less tractable fund flows such as into equities,
real estate, and other direct investment; neither is there good information
on OPEC's stock of assets. Their portfolio composition, as well as their
investment decisions at the margin, remains substantially unrevealed.
Publically released information, such as the AT&T loan from Saudi Arabia,
account for only a very minor portion of their transactions. Thus, knowledge
of the asset characteristics desired by OPEC is negligible in the importing
countries, and perhaps even in OPEC itself. Certainly a more experienced
OPEC investor like Kuwait, or perhaps Iran, has a portfolio composition
different from other OPEC countries. Also, low absorption countries may
have different portfolios from potentially high absorbers. In fact, some
authorities speculate that the high absorption countries by now have only
a relatively small amount of foreign assets and all of those in liquid form.
Thus with no accurate data, and with few clear indications of OPEC portfolio
choice to provide clues as to where their funds are going, a comprehensive
documentation is not possible.
Many countries report no data on OPEC investments within their confines,
and there certainly are no published forecasts of the future OPEC investment
disposition. This also hampers a proper analysis of the future need for
recycling facilities and investment media. Thus many existing financing
proposals respond only to short-term, partial-equilibrium considerations.
-22-
Several sources, most notably: (1) Morgan Guaranty Trust; (2) ..UeS.
Treasury and Department of Commerce; (3) The Bank of England; and (4) The
Bank for International Settlements have made estimates of OPEC's investment
disposition. These flow estimates are constructed from reported transactions
data within their respective purviews. These estimates are relatively consistent
(not necessarily surprising since they use similar information). They are
most certainly useful as a first approximation.
The following is a brief analysis of OPEC investment in the U.K., U.S.,
and Euromarkets. Due to the estimated nature of the data, an analysis of
any depth greater than that herein may not be fruitful.
2.1 United Kingdom
The following is a brief description of the OPEC investment and financing
effects in 1974 and 1975 in the U.K. The trends noted may give an indication
as to the future portfolio aspects of OPEC investing. For example, the Bank
of England concludes there is a tendency for OPEC investments in the U.K.
to be going longer-term. U.S. Treasury Secretary Simon says (July 1974) that
the same tendency is true for OPEC investments in the U.S. Whether these
conclusions, if indeed valid, are due to such things as the moderation in
the "inverse" relationship of long/short interest rates in the U.K., the U.S.,
or other portfolio considerations remains a hypothetical question. For example,
notice in Table 3 the rise in sterling holdings by OPEC in 74:4 was smaller
than for 74:3. This is presumed due to increased OPEC investments in "U.K.
property and equities," and by OPEC direct long-term lending to the British
public sector. However, this was also the time (December 1974) of Saudi
Arabia's decision to take payment all in dollars rather than 25% in pounds
and 75% in dollars. This latter action would imply reduced OPEC holdings of
-23-
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sterling in that oil companies wouldn't need sterling deposits anymore to
pay Saudi Arabia, which in turn doesn't receive pounds to deposit in U.K.
banks. On balance for 1974, OPEC added 2,215 million to their sterling
holdings. This amount was only slightly less than the increase in the U.K.
oil bill. Thus in partial equilibrium terms one might conclude that the oil-
exporting countries financed the largest part of t U.K. current account
deficit. Additionally, trade credits (on oil companies from OPEC) were also
important, as were capital influxes used to finance oil companies' development
of the North Sea fields. As can be seen, Britain's international reserves
actually increased in 1974 over 1973 by $463 million.
On trade1 balance with OPEC, the U.K. reported the following:
74:1 74:2 74:3
U.K. exports to OPEC, $ million 481.8 914.5 525.4
U.K. imports from OPEC, $ million 2,002.4 3,232.1 1,351.3
Net on current account with OPEC, -1,520.6 -2,317.6 -825.9
$ million
Tables 4, 5, and 6 give three estimates of the world's disposition of
OPEC surplus investible funds. The numbers don't necessarily bear out the
Bank of England conclusion that OPEC investments in the U.K. are shifting to
longer-term. For example, maturities of government securities are not really
identified. Indeed Morgan Guaranty Trust reports in World Financial Markets
(4-15-75) that although OPEC investments in the U.S. are turning longer-term
(e.g., corporate stocks and bonds), OPEC U.K. investments are staying in
1
Data on capital account transactions between OPEC and the U.K. can only
be calculated as a residual.
2
Source: Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England. Direction of Trade data
is significantly different in amounts.
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Government securities with no discernible term to maturity shifting. However,
anecdotal evidence indicates OPEC long-term investments in the U.K. are
increasing (e.g., Kuwait real estate purchases). OPEC does seem to be
increasing its proportion of investment in equities, real estate, and "other"
in the world exclusive of the U.S. and U.K.
The prospects for financing the U.K.'s OPEC trade deficit in 1975 are
unclear. As can be seen in Table 4, total cash receipts by OPEC decreased in
75:1 from 74:4 by $3.2 billion. However, the proportion paid OPEC in sterling
decreased from 18+% to less than 16%. This share declined to approximately 11%
in 75:2. The U.K.'s share of OPEC total investments remained level in 75:1
but dropped dramatically in 75:2. Finally, the following facts must be considered:
1. U.K. has no net borrowing available under the IMF
oil facility.
2. U.K. trade exports to OPEC decreased substantially in
74:3 compared with 74:2.
3. OPEC is maintaining a liquid position with regard to its
U.K. investments vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
4. Saudi Arabia is still accepting no sterling payments on
its export account.
5. OPEC capital flows to the U.K. were of substantial
importance in financing its 1974 deficit. These
inflows appear to be dwindling for 1975.
6. Anecdotal evidence indicates the U.K. is actively seeking
loans from OPEC countries for 1975, in addition to the
major Iranian loan in late 1974.
2.2 United States
Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 present various estimatesof OPEC's investments in
the U.S. There seems to be an increase in the OPEC investment proportion
going into long-term holdings. Simon, the Bank of England, and Morgan Guaranty
-30-
TABLE 7
Estimated OPEC Investments in the U.S. - 1973 to 1975:1
1973 1974 74:1 74:'2 74:3 74:4 1975:1
Increase (+) in U.S.
Liquid Liabilities
to OPEC (including All
Liabilities to OPEC
Official Agencies) 0.5 10.7 1.1 2.8 4.5 2.3
Net Purchases (+)
of U.S. Equities
(Stocks) by OPEC 0.1 0.3 --- 0.1 0.2
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business,
June 1975, current $ Billion.
0.5
0.3
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all acclaim this as a noticeable trend. However, based on the numbers, the
validity of this conclusion is questionable as the actual dollar amounts are
very small. The U.S. share of total OPEC investments decreased slightly
from 21% in 1974 to 18% in 1975.
2.3 Euromarkets
Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the estimated OPEC investments in the Euromarkets,
primarily in Eurodollar deposits. This category is quite significant as a
proportion of total OPEC investments (44% in 1974 and 24% in 1975). Notice
in Table 4 that the share of total going to foreign currency deposits
(Euromarket) outside the U.K. and U.S. markets approximately doubled in
75:1 and 75:2 over 1974.
According to the Bank for International Settlements, new deposits by
OAPEC1 continued to be the most important single source of new Eurocurrency
funds. Flows from this source were estimated at $3.5 billion in 75:1, down
from $5.4 billion in 74:4. The total increase in the Euromoney market flow
was $6 billion in 75:1, or about one-half the expansion in 74:4. Of this $6
billion increase, one-half was in currencies other than dollars. Thus OAPEC
accounted for approximately 59% of the increase in the Eurocurrency market
in 75:1, up from 45% in 74:4. Further, a larger proportion of this went
into non-dollar currencies, in particular the Deutsche Mark. Note that 75:1
was a period of dollar weakness.
1Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
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3. OPEC-RELATED FINANCIAL PROPOSALS
There is no complete compendium of the various financial proposals
which have been put forth to solve the "problems" of OPEC surplus investible
funds and importing country deficit financing. The number uf serious proposals
is small and only a limited number of them have been put into operation,
primarily as supplemental measures. In general, the processes of primary
and secondary recycling have taken place through existing market mechanisms
with little or no overt government intervention. The international adjustment
mechanisms, as reflected in the trade and capital accounts, seem in 1974 to
have adequately handled the OPEC induced "shock" to the international system.
In terms of financing, the international capital markets were not overly
"strained," contrary to early predictions. These markets most certainly
carried the brunt of the financing weight. Special facilities,such as that
implemented by the IMF and Germany's loan to Italy, were used as short-term
supplemental measures. However, the actual necessity of their existence
is not clear. In any event, two points are worth noting:
(1) The international capital markets functioned relatively
effectively in the recycling process despite announced
expectations to the contrary. That is the markets and
their process performed adequately in spite of further
destabilizing actions by those who acted on the cries
of "wolf." This is not to imply that the future holds
no recycling problems--only that 1974 pulled through.
Perhaps the cries of wolf induced the major market
participants to act in a more stabilizing fashion due
to greater awareness or concern.
-33-
(2) The early predictions of dire consequences for the industrialized
world and international capital markets were obviously based
only on partial equilibrium considerations. In a general
equilibrium context it is perhaps not at all surprising that
the adjustments of 1974 were smooth. This result is so aptly
shown in the trade context in the Agmon-Laffer paper.
The above discussion is not a comprehensive discussion of recycling.
Nor is it to imply that post-1974 years will adjust smoothly or that the
adjustments of 1974 were necessarily efficient in Pareto-Optimal terms.
Rather its points are that: (1) only a few of the various proposals were
actually implemented; (2) their relative effect was small; (3) they are
seemingly short-term in function; and (4) they were promulgated on partial
equilibrium concerns.
The case of LDC's (less developed countries) may be an exception to
the above. Short-term, the international adjustment process seems to have
worked against this group of countries. Specific programs of accomodation
for LDC deficit financing by OECD countries, OPEC, and world financial
institutions (e.g., IBRD and IMF) may have been a critical input. The
focus of some proposals was solely on the LDC situation.
The project of researching the various proposals, ascertaining their
status, and anlyzing the effects of those implemented can be a very time-
consuming process. Thus, this paper is limited to a source-listing of
the various proposals.
The following three sources yield the best summaries of major financial
proposals:
Agmon, T. and A.B. Laffer, "Trade Effects of the Oil Crisis," M.I.T.
Sloan School of Management Working Paper Number 809-75, September 1975.
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1. Agmon, T.B. and D.R. Lessard, "Financial Markets and Oil
Revenues: An Analysis of the Role of Financial Markets
as Limiting Factors on Production and on the 'Recycling'
of Funds Among Importing Countries," April 1975.
2. Alexander, S.S., "Problems For a Task Force on International
Oil: Financing, Prices, and Security of Supply,"
February 1975.
3. Roosa, R.V. et al., "How Can the World Afford OPEC Oil?,"
Foreign Affairs, Volume 53, No. 2, January 1975.
Using these as an outline, additional detail, proposals and status of
proposals can be gleaned from a survey of other sources which include the
following:
1. Euromoney (is also a good source for specific proposals
put forth by OPEC members themselves--often an
overlooked sphere of influence).
2. OECD Economic Outlook
3. Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements
4. The New York Times
5. The Wall Street Journal
6. Kleinman, D.T., "A Plan To Utilize The Excess Capital Reserves
Of The Oil Producing Countries To Assist The Economic
Development Of The Third World," paper delivered at the
Fifth International University for Presidents, Young
President's Organization, Inc., Paris, May 1974.
7. Stauffer, T.R., "Oil Money and World Money: Conflict or
Confluence?," Science, Volume 184, No. 4134, April 19, 1974.
8. Fried, E.R., "Perspectives on Energy," The Brookings Bulletin,
Volume 12, No. 2, Spring 1975.
9. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
10. Quarterly Bulletin, Bank of England
11. Petroleum Industry Trends
12. Barattieri, V. (of Banca d' Italia, Rome), "The Oil Exporters
and the Euromarkets," Euromoney, May 1974.
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13. Teman, A. (Managing Director, Banque Nationale d'Algerie,
Algiers), "An Oil-Based Arab Currency," Euromoney, May 1974.
14. Asseily, A., "Hustling the East Into Recycling its Funds,"
Euromoney, July 1974.
15. Sh. Nashashibi, H., (Investment Manager, Arab Fund for Economic
and Social Development, Kuwait), "Other Ways to Recycle Oil
Surpluses," Euromoney, August 1974.
16. Abushadi, M.M. (Chairman, Union de Banques Arabes et Francaises),
"Will New York Attract Arab Capital?," Euromoney, September 1974.
17. Melville, M. (Hambros Bank, London), "The Arcru: Something For
Everyone, Not A One-Way Street," Euromoney, Saptember 1974.
18. Hoss, S. (Chairman and General Manager, Banque Nationale pour
le Developpment Industriel et Touristique, Beirut), "Developing
Longer-Term Channels for Arab Oil Money," Euromoney, October 1974.
19. Abi Saleh, F. (Assistant General Manager, Investment and Finance
Bank, Beirut), "Putting Oil Revenues in Their Proper Context,"
Euromoney, October 1974.
20. Kuczynski, P.P., "Recycling Petrodollars to the Third World,"
Euromoney, November 1974.
21. Turner, J.N., "IMF Recycling--What Happens Next?," Euromoney,
December 1974.
22. Kuranda, H., "The EEC's New Oil Money Loan," Euromoney,
December 1974.
23. Ali, A., "Explaining Saudi Arabia's Attitude to Recyling,"
Euromoney, December 1974.
24. Mendelsohn, M.S., "Recycling Along Nine Channels," Euromoney,
January 1975.
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4. CHRONOLOGY OF OPEC-RELATED FINANCIAL EVENTS
OPEC was organized in 1960 with the avowed purpose of stopping the
decline in world crude oil prices. Throughout the next decade, its economic
muscle was fairly weak. Nevertheless, the undercurrents of "spectacular"
events such as the October 1973 and January 1974 posted price increases
were apparent throughout the latter 1960's and early 1970's. The price
rises and supply boycott did not materialize out of thin air. Rather they
were the culmination of visible events and policies of the 1971-1973 period
during which time OPEC's strength and unique monopolistic market position
coalesced. As Mancke [1-2] correctly notes, during 1970 to 1973 Saudi
Arabia and Iran supplied nearly 75% of the net additions to world oil
demands. At the same time, U.S. output was declining.
There exist a few, somewhat detailed chronologies covering the period
up to January 1974 when the second major posted price increase was effected.
Usually, these chronologies specialize in events of a certain character such
as: (1) Dealings of the multinational oil companies with the OPEC members.
Here one might find a description of the interaction between firms and
countries as producer states sought to gain control of the MNC's operating
subsidiary; (2) World financial market reactions to the expected and actual
effects of the price rise and supply boycott. Foreign exchange rate movements
would be discussed here. Thus the purpose (e.g., Senate hearings on MNCs)
for which the particular chronology was prepared dictates its emphasis.
A synthesis of these existing chronologies will provide good coverage
of the various financial, corporate, major political and market (e.g., oil
price movements) events of the period up to January 1974. However, nowhere
is there compiled a chronology of the events from early 1974 to the present.
This is, of course, the period during which the financial effects were most
-37-
evident and thus of most interest. The chronology contained in Barclay's
Review does go through the end of 1975. Its emphasis is on major financial
events, but it is not complete. Therefore, we have also listed some of the
supplemental source material which would be needed to fill in the gaps. It
would be a time-consuming task to collate all this information into a complete
chronology.
Listed below are the major sources of chronologies and events.
I. Existing Chronologies
1. Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy -
Hearings before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on MNCs,
Parts 4, 5, and 6.
2. Mancke, Richard B., "The Future of OPEC," Journal of Business,
Volume 48, No. 1, January 1975.
3. Roosa, R.V. et al., "How Can The World Afford OPEC Oil?,"
Foreign Affairs, Volume 53, No. 2, January 1975.
4. Fieleke, N.S., "Oil and International Payments," New England
Economic Review, November/December 1974.
5. Barclay's Review, published quarterly by the Group Economic
Intelligence Unit, Barclay's Bank Ltd., London
II. Supplemental Sources
1. OECD Economic Outlook
2. Euromoney
3. World Financial Markets by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
4. Petroleum Industry Trends
5. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
6. McLachlan, K. and Ghorban, N., Oil Production, Revenues
and Economic Development, QER Special No. 18, The
Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., London.
7. The New York Times
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8. The Wall Street Journal
9. Quarterly Bulletin, The Bank of England
10. Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements
11. Middle East Economic Survey
12. The Brookings Bulletin
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5. NOTE ON FEDERAL (U.S.) INCOME TAXATION OF U.S.-BASED
MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS
The Federal Tax Reduction Act of 1975, signed into law on March 29, 1975,
contained major changes affecting the operations of U.S.-based oil companies.
This note specifically summarizes these changes as they pertain to the foreign
operations of these companies. The Act became effective on January 1, 1975
and is applicable to taxable years ending after December 31, 1974. For
fiscal year taxpayers this implies taxable income must be divided into two
portions in the transition year, with the cut-off date being December 31, 1974.
The major effects of this Act are to change the tax treatment of:
1. Depletion Allowances
2. Foreign Tax Credits
3. Investment Tax Credits
We treat each of these aspects separately. The reader is encouraged to
reflect on how these respective changes will affect the following decisions
of multinational oil companies:
1. Investment
2. Geographical Distribution
of Profits
3. Organization Structure (in
legal/accounting sense
as well as in management
terms)
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5.1 Depletion Allowances
Depletion allowances are allowed as deductions from gross income
(net of royalties) for tax purposes for any entity with an economic interest
(i.e., derives income from or has an investment in) in an oil or gas deposit.
Computation of this deduction can take two forms:
1. "Cost depletion" - Estimated total mineral reserves (in
units - e.g., barrels of oil) is divided by estimated
total cost of extraction to obtain a per unit cost of
extraction or "depletion." This cost figure multiplied
by the units extracted in the taxable period yields the
amount of "cost depletion" deduction in computing
taxable income for that period.
2. "Percentage depletion" - A straight percentage (= 22%
for oil and gas production) of gross income is used
as the depletion deduction in computing taxable income.
However, this deduction is limited to 50% of the
taxable income from the operation excluding the
deduction for depletion.
In general, the "percentage depletion" deduction greatly exceeds the
amount computed under "cost depletion." Under the old tax law, companies
traditionally applied this percentage depletion on U.S. as well as foreign
oil operations against their U.S. taxes. In any event, the law required
them to take the largest depletion deduction.
The new law (effective January 1, 1975) severely restricts the
deduction for percentage depletion on oil and gas production. In particular,
foreign operations no longer qualify for the use of the percentage depletion
method. They must now use the cost depletion method which traditionally
has been less beneficial in terms of tax savings.
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5.2 Foreign Tax Credits
The new tax law defines two income terms, knowledge of which is
necessary to an understanding of the new provisions:
1. "Foreign oil and gas extraction income" is defined as income
derived from sources outside the U.S. and its possessions
from:
a. The extraction of minerals from oil or gas wells
b. The sale or exchange of assets used by the
taxpayer in the extraction of minerals
from oil or gas wells
c. Taxable dividends (actually/or as deemed paid by
U.S. law "Subpart F") from a foreign corporation
(including subsidiaries) to the extent attributable
to the foreign corporation's (i.e., payer's) foreign
oil or gas extraction income.
d. The distributive share of a partnership's income, to the
extent attributable to the partnership's foreign oil
or gas extraction income.
2. "Foreign oil related income" is defined as income from sources
outside the U.S. and its possessions from "foreign oil and
gas extraction income" (as defined above) plus the following:
a. The processing of such minerals into their primary
products
b. The transportation, distribution, or sale of such
minerals or their primary products
c. Taxable dividends received from a U.S. corporation
to the extent attributable to the payer's foreign
oil-related income.
Obviously "foreign oil-related income" is a much broader category since it
includes "foreign oil and gas extraction income."
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Under the old law "foreign tax credits" could be credited against
computed income taxes. However, the new law contains significant changes
in both the definition of allowable tax credits and their computation.
These new provisions are as follows:
(1) In computing a taxable period's foreign oil or gas extraction
income, a foreign oil or gas extraction net operating loss
for that period from one country may no longer be offset
against income from other countries. However, such a loss
may be used as an offset for purposes of computing the
taxpayer's foreign oil-related income. Further, if oil or
gas is disposed of or is acquired other than from a foreign
government at a "posted" or other price which differs from
the fair market value, the latter shall be used in computing
foreign oil or gas extraction taxable income.
Effective January 1, 1976, these loss offsets deriving from
foreign oil-related income computation may also no longer be
used against income from other countries. Finally, foreign
oil-related loss carry-forwards must be used only against
future oil-related income. Thus a corporation may not use
foreign oil-related losses to offset income in any of its
other non-oil operations. This is the so-called "recapture"
provision.
(2) A ceiling has been imposed on the amount of foreign income
taxes, incurred on foreign oil and gas extraction income,
which are eligible for the foreign tax credit. This ceiling
provides that such foreign income taxes are not eligible for
foreign tax credit to the extent they exceed the following
percentages of the statutory U.S. corporate income tax
rate (currently = 48%).
a. For taxable years ending in 1975: 110% of the statutory
U.S. rate. Thus, 110% times 48% = 52.8% effective
ceiling.
b. For taxable years ending in 1976: 105% of the statutory
U.S. rate. Thus, 105% times 48% = 50.4% effective
ceiling.
c. For subsequent taxable years: statutory U.S. rate
plus 2%. Thus, 48% + 2% = 50% effective ceiling.
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Further, foreign tax credit carryovers from the taxable years
ending before 1975 to years ending in 1975 and thereafter are
to be calculated as if the above ceiling on foreign income
taxes eligible for credit was in effect in the year the
foreign income taxes were incurred.
These ceilings do not apply to the components of foreign oil
related income which are not also included in foreign extraction
income. If a company uses any foreign tax credits, then it may
not use other taxes paid to a foreign country as a deduction
from U.S. taxable income if these other taxes are ineligible
for the foreign tax credit, except as follows. Income taxes
paid to a foreign country in connection with the purchase or
sale of oil or gas extracted in that country are not eligible
for a foreign tax credit against U.S. taxes unless the tax-
payer has an economic interest in those minerals and bought/
sold them at a price other than the fair market value. However,
these "ineligible for foreign tax credit" income tax payments
to foreign countries may still be claimed as a deduction in
computing U.S. taxable income.
5.3 Investment Tax Credits
Eligibility for investment tax credit for drilling rigs and other
property used for offshore exploration and production activities has been
restricted under the new law. These restrictions are effective for property
acquired, constructed, or repaired after March 18, 1976. The old law made
eligible for the investment tax credit any property other than a sea-going
vessel or aircraft when the property was used in international or territorial
waters to explore, produce, and transport resources. The new law requires
such property to be used exclusively in the territorial waters of North
America and the Caribbean. The main purpose of this provision was to reduce
company investments in drilling rigs outside the U.S. territorial waters.
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